We combine consideration of Duverger's Law (Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. London: Methuen, 1954) with Demsetz's (J Law Econ 11:55-65, 1968) theory of natural monopoly to provide a novel perspective on the meaning and measurement of electoral competitiveness in a single member district, plurality rule electoral system. In the Duverger-Demsetz view we develop, the degree of competition is determined by the contestability of elections. Contestability declines with party fragmentation, and so an increase in the effective number of parties above the long run level of 2 predicted by Duverger's 'Law' for plurality based single seat elections signals a decline in competitiveness. This argument runs contrary to the view, sometimes expressed in empirical studies of elections and public policy, that more candidates or parties, each with a smaller vote share reflects a more competitive environment. Using the history of the Canadian parliamentary system, we provide qualified support for the Duverger-Demsetz perspective by studying the relationship between the concentration of vote shares and a new index of electoral contestability. Extension of the argument to proportional electoral systems is also considered.
are more competitors than available seats, a tight race for votes and seats, and frequent 24 turnover in control. Contestation implies ex ante electoral uncertainty (Gerring et al. 2015, 25 p. 574).
26
The suggestion here that greater fragmentation of vote shares signals more 27 competition is analogous to the conclusion usually reached about an industry when 28 the concentration of output across firms declines. But an electoral system is not a 29 private goods market.
AQ3

30
To fix ideas as we proceed, we illustrate the concepts and associated indexes 31 of competitiveness discussed for the history of the Canadian parliamentary system. 32 In doing so we find qualified support for the Duverger-Demsetz perspective on the 33 measurement of electoral competitiveness. This support appears in the inverse co-34 movement uncovered between fragmentation and a new index of the contestability 35 of elections, as we measure these dimensions of the Canadian electoral system using 36 the history of regular national elections from the first election in 1867 to the forty-37 first election in 2011.
38
Strictly speaking, our analysis of the conceptual issues and its empirical appli-39 cation to Canada applies only to a single member district, plurality rule (SMP) 40 electoral system. However, the argument may also apply to winner take all systems 41 that use forms of voting in which there is only one round, such as the alternative 42 vote system. Towards the end of the paper we consider whether the argument can be 43 applied to systems of proportional representation. 44 We begin in Sect. 2 of the paper by considering in some detail how increased 45 fragmentation may be mistaken for a signal of greater competitiveness when 46 competition is associated with electoral uncertainty and, as a practical matter, 47 indexed by the closeness of electoral contests. This is followed in Sect. 3 by 48 development of the Duverger-Demsetz perspective on electoral competitiveness, in 49 which party governance in an SMP system is interpreted as being analogous to the 50 management of a natural monopoly. Section 4 presents evidence consistent with 51 the Duverger-Demsetz view using data from the history of Canadian elections. Here we consider how a new index of the contestability of elections relates 53 to fragmentation of the electoral system. We show that as the effective number of 54 parties rises above 2 and fragmentation increases, competitiveness as judged by 55 our contestability index declines. Section 5 discusses the problems of extending 56 the analysis to proportional systems, and Sect. 6 concludes.
57
Before continuing, it is important to note that our basic interest in what follows 58 is not with an explanation of the effective number of parties or with the testing of 59 Duverger's Law. We are interested in what is meant by political competition and 60 how it can be measured. Competitiveness, as distinct from a given state of perfect or 61 imperfect competition, is undoubtedly complex and difficult to study. In addition 62 to (1) the entry and exit of candidates and parties and (2) the rivalry between 63 them in an election, political competition in an electoral system also includes (3) 64 competition among parties in the legislature between elections, (4) competition 65 among governments and bureaus, and (5) relationships among these forces. In this 66 paper we focus on particular aspects of the first and second dimensions of the 67 process.
68
From the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of Market
69
Concentration to Uncertainty and Closeness in Elections
70
A key aspect of economic competition that lies behind the often used Herfindahl (HH) index of economic competitiveness (Hirschman 1945 ) concerns 72 the ability of firms to affect market price. To the extent that individual firms are 73 unable to influence market prices, the firm has no market power and the industry is 74 said to be highly or perfectly competitive. This feature of a competitive market is 75 usually translated into an index of competitiveness through the logic that if there are 76 more firms, each of which supplies a smaller share of market demand, the ability of 77 any individual firm to influence the market price will be reduced. The HH index is 78 designed to encapsulate this logic and is defined as the sum of the squared market 79 shares of the firms in an industry. That is, 
where s ij is the output share of the ith of N firms in industry j. The HH index will 81 equal one if one firm supplies the entire market and will approach zero as the number 82 of firms increase and each firm's market share declines.
83
The Hirschman-Herfindahl measure of concentration has crossed over into 84 political science as the effective number of candidates or parties (ENP), defined 85 as one over an HH index constructed using candidate or party vote (or seat) shares 
where ENP jt D 1=
ijt is the effective number of candidates at the constituency 88 level and v ijt is the vote share of candidate i in constituency j in election t. 89 Alternatively, we could employ the vote or seat shares of political parties at the 90 national level to define a national party-based analogue to (2). In either case ENP 91 will equal 2 if two candidates or parties equally share the vote and will rise as the 92 number of candidates or parties increases and their individual vote shares decline. A closely related measure of the fragmentation or fractionalization of the 94 electorate was proposed by Rae (1968) . His measure, Fragmentation, is defined as 95 1 HH or, equivalently, 1 1/ENP, with ENP as in (2) above. At the constituency 96 level, this index can be thought of as a measure of the probability that two randomly 97 chosen individuals will not share the same partisan association. It approaches 1 as 98 voters become more fractionalized.
99
Both ENP and Fragmentation, defined as national averages over constituency 100 level values based on vote shares, are shown in Fig. 1 . In these cases, we set v 1 D 1 in a constituency with an acclamation in the case of ENP defined for constituencies. The presence of 2-seat constituencies (123 before the 28th election in 1968) makes little difference to the averages over all constituencies that form the basis for the measures discussed in this section. It is interesting to note in this respect, however, that for one-seat constituencies, the mean for all elections of the constituency level ENP D 2.4, while for the two-seat constituencies, mean ENP D 4.0. We also note that there are 10,247 regular individual constituency elections in elections 1 through 41. The maximum number of candidates in any one constituency election from 1867 to 2011 (general elections 1-41) is 13. The maximum number of parties in any one election (taking self-named parties as a party without judgement of its success), independent candidates and candidates of unknown affiliation is 27, in the 19th election in 1940. On the development of the party system in Canada up to 1908, see recently Godbout and Hoyland (2013) .
The Duverger-Demsetz Perspective on Electoral Competitiveness. . . To a considerable extent the use of the HH index in political science derives from 109 the desire to test the predictions by Duverger (1954) about the effective number of 110 candidates and parties that will arise in a long run electoral equilibrium. 4 Duverger 111 argues that in a single member district, plurality rule electoral system, the number 112 of political parties at the district or constituency level tends towards 2 in the long 113 run. 5 Cox (1997, p. 271) interprets this as an upper bound on what he refers to as the 114 carrying capacity of the electoral system. In a majoritarian parliamentary system, in 115 Duverger's view, factions are forced together into two parties before the election by 116 the winner take all aspect of the electoral system. This contrasts with the formation 117 of coalition government after the election in a system of proportional representation. 118 Cox (1997, p. 30) attributes the Law to elites-opinion leaders, contributors, party 119 officials, etc-who do not want to waste their influence on hopeless candidates, and 120 to strategic choices made by individual voters for the same reason, with uncertainty 121 in the process introduced by the problems for elites and voters of coordinating to 122 decide who is, and who is not, a serious candidate.
123
It should be emphasized that Duverger's Law is in the first instance a statement 124 about two party competition at the district or constituency level. Even if the 125 Law holds there, the two parties competing at the local level may differ across 126 regions, thus leading to more than two at the center. competition between the same two parties requires additional assumptions. Despite 130 this qualification however, Duverger's Law is far stronger than any result in 131 economics concerning the number of firms in a competitive market equilibrium. 132 In a perfectly competitive market, the number of firms is indeterminate. We shall 133 return to the differences between indexes of fragmentation and competition defined 134 at the constituency level and at the national level later. Here we wish to explain why 135 it is tempting, though probably misleading, to use an HH-related index such as the 136 average constituency value of ENP to measure the degree of electoral competition. 137 How could a rise in ENP or in Fragmentation be associated with increased 138 electoral competitiveness despite the absence in elections of an analogue to a market 139 price that can be manipulated by participants?
6 One influential argument is that AQ5 140 fragmentation of vote shares may serve as a proxy for political competitiveness 141 when competition is associated with electoral uncertainty. The reasoning begins 142 with the view that as a practical matter, electoral uncertainty can be metered by 143 the closeness of elections in terms of candidate or party vote shares. Then, because 144 greater fragmentation of the party system often leads to splitting of the vote among 145 the contenders for office, it usually results in closer and thus more uncertain and 146 competitive election contests.
147
The idea that an election is competitive when its outcome is highly uncertain 148 or 'too close to call' is a sensible one that is widely employed. See, for example, 149 Franklin (2004) 
Electoral Uncertainty as Closeness in Elections and Its
157
Relationship to Fragmentation
158
One measure of the closeness of an election at the constituency or district level that 159 appears in the literature is that proposed by Endersby et al. (2002) . Their index of 160 the closeness of the election in constituency j in election t, CL jt (K), is 
166
In our implementation of this index we set K D 3 because, historically, the sum 167 of the first three vote shares (in elections 1-41) constitutes on average 0. 97 of the 168 vote and has never been less than 0.90 of the vote with a small standard deviation of 169 0.026. As with ENP, this measure is aggregated up to the national level by averaging 170 across constituencies.
171
It is important to note that because CL is designed to measure closeness, it 172 must differ from ENP to some extent. For example, ENP treats the outcome 173 (.5, .5; ENP D 2) as inherently different than (.33, .33, .33; ENP D 3), while both 174 cases can be said to be examples of equally close or highly competitive elections 175 and are treated as such by the CL index. Even so, it may still be that ENP as a 176 measure of fragmentation may serve as a rough proxy for closeness defined by (3). 177 To see if that is so, Fig. 1 The downward trend in Closeness(3) after about the 30th election is not picked up by the fragmentation indexes. 9 The idea of adjusting vote margins for volatility is analogous to standardizing scores by dividing the differences by a standard deviation. In the usual difference of means test, whether a difference is large or small is defined in terms of the normalized value of that difference in standard error units, with the standard error of the mean simply a specialized version of a standard deviation. In this way, any conclusion about the existence of a "meaningful" difference will reflect the level of uncertainty as to whether any observed difference might be due to chance alone. calculation of volatility here is not without its own complications, and is discussed 207 at length shortly.) That is, the correlation is negative as well as low. Hence in 208 the Canadian case, the simple vote margin, which is widely used as a measure of 209 closeness in elections, is unreliable as a measure of volatility adjusted closeness. 210 We suspect that this problem with the unadjusted vote margin arises in many other 211 cases.
212
The Przeworski and Sprague (1971) version of the volatility adjusted vote 213 margin-hereafter, the PS index-is an especially interesting example of the class 214 of measures of electoral uncertainty that incorporates vote volatility. As well as 215 allowing for volatility, the PS index has embedded in it a specific view of the 216 objectives of the losing candidates: namely that the primary objective of every 217 candidate is to overcome his or her vote deficit vis a vis the incumbent.
218
To construct the PS volatility adjusted vote margin index for Canada, the lagged 219 vote deficit faced by each party or candidate p in constituency j at election time t, 220 v 1jt 1 v pjt 2 is adjusted for the potential volatility of the vote to form the ratio 221 h 
where volatility in the denominator is calculated across superconstituencies as 223 volatility st 1 D P 12 pD1ˇv pst 1 v pst 2ˇ= 2 and where for the incumbent, p D 1 and 224 h D 0. Note that the ex ante-ex post issue always faced when using actual election 225 outcomes is explicitly dealt with in (4) by using a lag of one election in both 226 numerator and denominator.
227
Two particular issues that arise in calculating volatility in the denominator of (4) 228 should be noted: (1) To allow for changes in constituency boundaries as constituen-229 cies are added and/or redrawn over time, it is necessary to derive vote and volatility 230 measures for what we call superconstituencies. These are small aggregations of 231 individual constituencies defined on an unchanging geographical basis. (We define 232 80 of these). We then assign to each party in each constituency in each election the 233 average constituency level vote of that party in the superconstituency. This allows 234 us to measure changes in votes across elections for each party, and thus to derive 235 volatility measures despite the continual redistricting that has occurred over the 236
decades; (2) A second issue that must be faced is how to define political parties. 237 We also require that a 'party' win at least one seat in at least two general elections 238 to be considered as such; thus the data are defined for 11 political parties (see the 239 Appendix) plus an Other or residual category. Exploration of the consequences of 240 using other definitions are left for the future, as are the effect of using alternative 241 definitions of the superconstituencies. The following index for party p in constituency j is then calculated as:
For a highly competitive party, c D 1 because the distance to go to become the 244 winner is less than the floating vote or portion of the electorate that switched parties 245 last time. Otherwise, the index is less than one and falling as the margin to be 246 overcome by a party grows relative to volatility.
247
Aggregating across all the parties in each constituency j using as weights the vote 248 share of the party in the constituency gives:
C j D 0 indicates no competition in the constituency and, accordingly, for ridings 250 where there was an acclamations we set C j D 0. National average competitiveness 251 across all constituencies for each election, the completed PS index, is then given by 252 the national weighted average
where adj_vw jt is the adjusted (for acclamations) vote weight of each constituency 254 in the national election. flat. This impression is confirmed by the correlations in Table 1 : over elections 1 262 through 41, both indexes of fragmentation are negatively correlated with the PS 263 index of volatility-adjusted vote margins at about 0.4.
264
For the Canadian case then, fragmentation does not serve as a good proxy for 265 electoral competitiveness when it is measured with an index that is designed to 266 reflect the average closeness of individual electoral contests, taking vote-volatility 267 into account. We hypothesize that for single member district, plurality rule electoral 268 systems, this conclusion holds more generally. There is a conceptual as well as an empirical basis for rejecting the view that 272 rising fragmentation signals the greater competitiveness of elections. To develop 273 this argument, we turn first to consider Demsetz's (1968) view of natural monopoly. 274 The discussion here begins with the first theorem of welfare economics linking 275 competition with economic efficiency before turning to Demsetz's contribution 276 and its applicability to Duverger's Law and SMP elections. The implication of 277 Demsetz's contribution for party governance is operationalized via the notion of 278 a contestable election, an idea developed more fully in the economic context by 279 Baumol (1982) and Baumol et al. (1982) .
In any economic product market, social welfare is maximized when the differ-281 ence between the total social benefit created by that product and the total social cost 282 of producing that product is maximized. This, in turn, implies that production should 283 be increased as long as the marginal social benefit exceeds its marginal social cost, 284 and when the two are equalized, the market is conventionally described as being 285 efficient. When the product in question is a private good (i.e., a good that cannot be 286 consumed simultaneously by more than one individual), two conditions are often 287 invoked to ensure efficiency. First, the firms producing the good under increasing 288 cost must be individually too small to influence the market selling price so that 289 each firm becomes a price taker. Under these circumstances the firm's incentive to 290 maximize profit means that each will produce where the market price equals its 291 private marginal cost, and realize profits if the market price exceeds average cost. 292 Second, there can be no barriers to new firm entry. This implies that firms will enter 293 the market as long as profit can be made which in turn raises industry output, lowers 294 the market price and reduces incumbent profit. In this way competition among 295 established firms and potential entrants guarantees that only the lowest cost firms 296 will survive and that all such firms will equate price to private marginal cost. It 297 follows that if private and social costs are identical, competition among firms in 298 the presence of these two conditions-price taking and the absence of barriers to 299 entry-are sufficient for market output to be efficient and for social welfare to be 300 maximized.
301
The sufficient conditions described above include two important caveats: first, 302 that cost conditions allow atomistic firms to be the low cost option and, second, 303 that the goods produced are not public goods that are nonrival in consumption. In 304 most industries, however, firm-level fixed costs are present. This means that firms 305 are typically not atomistic in size and to the extent that time and space allow some 306 degree of market segmentation, firms will retain some degree of market power and 307 control over price in the short run. To the extent that barriers to entry exist, such 308 market power can persist over the longer run. In either case the ability to raise the 309 selling price without losing all market share leads the profit maximizing firm to 310 reduce its output and raise its price above marginal cost. The degree to which price 311 diverges from marginal cost depends upon the degree of effective competition that 312 arises from the firms' rivals. All other things equal, the larger the market share held 313 by any firm, the more market power it has and the less competitive will be that 314 industry.
315
Recognition that the conditions for perfect competition do not exist has led 316 economists and policy makers to look for ways to assess how far any particular 317 industry departs from perfect competition. Here the inability to observe directly 318 either marginal social cost (as opposed to private average cost) or the level of 319 economic (as opposed to accounting) profit has required the development of 320 alternative measures to proxy the degree of competition. This has been done through 321 observable market shares. Hence it is argued that in private markets, more firms with 322 smaller market shares will have less market power which, in turn, will result in a 323 smaller divergence between price and marginal cost. As noted earlier, the HH index 324 is designed to reflect just such a tendency.
While the use of the HH index has been important in areas such as competition 326 policy, the second caveat to the sufficient conditions discussed above means that 327 the competitive implications of this index will not apply in a market with public 328 good characteristics. That is, unlike a market for private goods, net social value is 329 not maximized by equalizing the market price for each consumer and the marginal 330 cost of each producer. Rather social welfare is maximized when marginal social 331 cost is equated to the sum of the (potentially different) marginal social benefits 332 of each individual. Such markets-light from a lighthouse, knowledge generated 333 by a new idea, a television program for communal viewing-are often described 334 as being natural monopolies where concurrent consumption and cost minimization 335 combine to imply a single producer. In such cases, competition among consumers 336 and competition from incumbent producers and potential entrants cannot be relied 337 upon to induce efficiency.
12 Because the absence of effective competition allows 338 the monopolist to reduce output and raise price, many economists have advocated 339 regulation. Hence in many communities public utilities are granted a monopoly 340 right to produce in return for a commitment to satisfy market demand at regulated 341 prices. The latter, in turn, are designed to allow the utility only normal profits. To the 342 extent that the regulator can determine the appropriate set of market prices, greater 343 efficiencies can be realized.
344
In a provocative article entitled "Why regulate utilities?", Demsetz (1968) argued 345 that the fact that there can be only one efficient producer does not preclude 346 competition from being used to improve upon the welfare generated within a 347 natural monopoly. By the splitting of two usually conjoined rights, the right to 348 own industry assets, and the right to determine the use of these assets, competition 349 among potential managers over the dimensions of industry output and the prices at 350 which output is marketed can be used to better approximate an efficient solution. 351 That is, encouraging competition among potential managers over promised levels 352 of industry output and the prices to be set can be used to achieve better market 353 outcomes. In essence, the competitive process will end up revealing the insider 354 information that would be needed by regulators to set the appropriate output and 355 pricing terms. Market competition can in this way be refigured to meet the challenge 356 of a single producer of a public good and to overcome the information problems 357 facing public regulators.
358
Suppose then that Duverger's Law is true and that 2 is the long run com-359 petitive equilibrium in an SMP system such as Canada's. The interpretation of 360 Duverger's Law as a long run competitive equilibrium fits easily into Demsetz's 361 (1968) re-interpretation of competitive equilibrium in economic markets served 362 12 If concurrent consumers cannot be excluded from consuming, competition among consumers for the lowest (zero) price will result in insufficient revenue being generated to support the efficient level of production. On the other hand, if concurrent consumers can be excluded, efficiency could be achieved by a producer setting the Lindahl (individual) prices needed to realize a level of output at which the sum of the individual marginal values equals marginal social cost. However in the absence of competing alternatives, the sole producer will exploit its market power, raise the set of Lindahl prices and under produce relative to the potentially efficient level.
by a natural monopolist. That is, because governance of the political process has 363 the characteristic of a public good-the policies and programs instituted by the 364 governing party are consumed by all constituents concurrently-the governing party 365 can be seen as analogous to the manager of a public utility. Because providing 366 governance in a collective has the same cost structure as a natural monopoly-a 367 single governing party/management team is the low cost service provider-social 368 benefit is maximized when there is only one manager or governance provider. 369 To avoid the reduction in service and higher cost that comes from the incentives 370 facing the monopoly provider, competition must exist over the right to provide that 371 service. This competition is provided through free and fair elections. However, for 372 such competition to enhance welfare, there must exist not only competing sets of 373 promised policy alternatives, but also a credible alternative manager that can step 374 in and perform should the promised level of performance be reneged upon or not 375 offered.
376
In this view, contestability in the sense developed by Demsetz and by Baumol 377 and his co-authors-understood as the ability to credibly replace the incumbent 378 producer-is the key mechanism by which the benefits of competition can be 379 realized effectively by the community. In the political arena, competition in an 380 election arises through the set of policies that competing parties view as better 381 reflecting the wishes of the electorate. However the public good characteristic of 382 governance means that effective competition comes not from the combined set of 383 policy alternatives on offer, but from the set that can be provided by the credible 384 alternative which must include the likelihood that that particular policy set will be 385 implemented. Here the instability of minor parties in SMP systems highlighted by 386 Duverger becomes critical. The incentive not to waste one's vote by supporting a 387 nonviable alternative implies that the greater is the degree of party fragmentation, 388 the less effective will second or third placed parties be as a constraint on the 389 performance of the governing party. Because greater fragmentation means that each 390 of the opposition parties is less likely to win a majority of seats, and since coalitions 391 are difficult to arrange and maintain over time in SMP systems, each of these parties 392 becomes less credible as a threat to the incumbent government. In such a fragmented 393 party system, the pressure on the governing party to make and keep election 394 promises is thus diminished. In short, from the Duverger-Demsetz perspective, a 395 rise in ENP above 2 signals a decline in effective electoral competitiveness.
AQ6
396 13 There is an additional, conceptually distinct source of inefficiency that may worsen with fragmentation. This stems from the possibility that as the number of parties increases, each party is forced by the division of the electorate to focus its electoral promises on a narrower segment of the electorate, thus moving the public sector towards special interest politics and away from concerns over the provision of general public services. See Lizzeri and Persico In the next section, we attempt to apply the Duverger-Demsetz view to Canada 397 by measuring the contestability of elections. But before we do so, it is interesting 398 to consider how the idea of competitiveness as electoral uncertainty fits with this 399 approach. Is a contestable election also highly uncertain? If we are concerned with 400 the consequences of competition, uncertainty in itself is not a necessary ingredient. 401 That is, in the absence of performance differences across contenting parties, 402 contestability will restrain the options of the incumbent such that replacement would 403 arise only when the incumbent party behaves 'badly' or miscalculates the nature 404 and distribution of voter preferences. On the other hand, if a candidate or party 405 is superior in terms of performance, we may observe long periods of one-party 406 dominance even in a highly contestable system, a point also made by Buchler 407 (2014). Thus in a framework in which contestability is the center of attention, one 408 party dominance and the absence of electoral uncertainty are not reliable indicators 409 of a lack of competition. The key requirement is that the threat 415 of replacement must be real, which requires the alternative to be credible. When 416 the incumbent can be replaced easily by a credible alternative we may say that the 417 electoral system is highly contestable. In this section we provide some empirical 418 support for the Duverger-Demsetz perspective using the history of the Canadian 419 parliamentary system to measure the contestability of elections at the national 420 level. We show that contestability has tended to be greater when the vote is less 421 fragmented.
422
As is well known, a good electoral strategy in a Westminster system like 423 Canada's is to target marginal constituencies: districts especially susceptible to 424 Ottawa is clearly not contestable. On the other hand, if every seat is marginal, 'every 430 seat is a battleground', as Bodet (2014) puts it.
431
Marginal seats as a measure contestability can be improved upon by incorporat-432 ing a measure of the asymmetry of safe seats among parties, on the grounds that a 433 party holding relatively more of the safe seats has an important advantage over its 434 opposition. This is because it is able to focus its resources on constituencies that are 435 thought to be marginal to a greater extent than its opposition. In what follows, we 436 construct an asymmetry adjusted marginal seat index and then consider how it is 437 related to fragmentation.
438
To operationalize the idea that the contestability of an election depends on the 439 asymmetry adjusted proportion of marginal seats in an election, we must first 440 define what marginal means. Hartle (1985) suggests that a marginal constituency 441 is one from which economic rents cannot be taken and redistributed to other places 442 without serious risk of electoral defeat. This is attractive as a definition of electoral 443 marginality, but impossible to apply without the ability to measure the distribution 444 of rents across constituencies, data which are as yet unavailable.
445
Previous work in Canada on marginal or safe seats includes Lovink (1973) and AQ7 446 most recently Bodet (2014). Both of these interesting studies use data for small 447 samples of Canada's electoral history. Bodet defines a safe seat as essentially one 448 that lies in the upper tail of the distribution of vote margins and uses a one standard 449 deviation above the mean based on the distribution of vote margins in the previous 450 election (and some ancillary criteria) as his cutoff. Winning margins larger than that 451 cutoff are considered sufficiently large to provide a substantial cushion of safeness to 452 the incumbent party in that constituency. We also employ the one standard deviation 453 standard in this initial exploration.
454
To measure a safe, or alternatively, marginal seat by party, we consider the 455 volatility adjusted, winning vote margin for the candidate of each incumbent party 456 p (which won at time t 1) in constituency j within superconstituency s in election 457 t, defined as 
If this IPmargin falls in the upper tail of the distribution of all such margins for all 459 parties for the previous three elections-e.g., it is more than one standard deviation 460 above the mean-the constituency is judged to be safe for that party. This algorithm, applied to all constituencies in each election, leads to the number 471 of seats that are considered to be safe in each election, t . We then compute the 472 proportion of marginal seats (in the total to be elected) in each election, MS t ,
as a measure of the competitiveness of the election as a whole. In this case, MS D 1 474 indicates that 100 % of the seats in Parliament are marginal.
475
As noted earlier, the proportion of marginal or safe seats does not in itself provide 476 a good index of contestability. How safe seats are distributed across parties, and in 477 particular, whether or not there is an asymmetry in their distribution, also matter. 478 Regardless of the number of marginal seats in total, an equal distribution of safe 479 seats across the major parties will result in a highly contestable election compared to 480 a situation in which the same number of safe seats are held predominately by just one 481 party. To acknowledge the importance of the distribution of safe seats to a judgment 482 about the contestability of an election, we adjust the proportion of marginal seats 483 MS t by the degree of asymmetry in safe seats among the parties to produce a better 484 measure of competitiveness at the national level.
485
To capture the notion of asymmetry, we borrow an idea used by Gaines and 486 Taagepera (2013) in a somewhat different context to define the Euclidean deviation 487 from a three party equal sharing of safe seats:
where S pkt D the seat shares in Parliament of the party in kth place in terms of 489 seats. Then 3 t D 0 if the safe seats are symmetrically distributed; and 3 t D 1 490 if one party has all the safe seats. In Canada's case the third 'party' is a residual 491 consisting of all other parties except the two major parties in Canada, the Liberals 492 and Conservatives (which are broadly defined as part of our 12 party aggregation). 493 An asymmetry index based on the proportion of marginal seats that acknowl-494 edges the asymmetry in their distribution may then be defined as:
MSadj t (the proportion of marginal seats adjusted for asymmetry) D MS t if safe seats 496 are symmetrically distributed among the parties, and is 0 if one party has all the safe 497 seats.
498
There is one further adjustment to make before the contestability index is 499 finished. The formulation in (11) may overweigh asymmetry. For example, if there 500 are only 3 safe seats in 300 held by only 1 party, MSadj D 0. To correct this problem, 501 we first adjust safe seats for asymmetry in their distribution: 
This is our metric of electoral contestability. AMS D 1 if all safe seats are symmet-506 rically distributed, and AMS D 1 t (the proportion of marginal seats) if one party 507 has all the safe seats.
508
In Fig. 3 below we show the AMS index for Canada in comparison to the 509 corresponding symmetry unadjusted series MS. It can be seen that in seven or eight 510 elections with a relatively small number of marginal seats, the asymmetry adjusted 511 index is much higher than the unadjusted one. This pattern indicates that in these 512 elections there is an important degree of symmetry in the distribution of safe seats 513 even though their absolute number may be small, and illustrates the necessity of 514 integrating the symmetry of the distribution of safe seats into the index of electoral 515 contestability (12). 
Fragmentation and Contestability in the History
of Canadian General Elections
518
We can now consider the relationship between fragmentation and our measure 519 of electoral contestability in a manner that sheds light on the Duverger-Demsetz 520 perspective. To do so, it is instructive to begin by looking at a scatter diagram 521 that relates both the AMS and PS indexes to the ENP Ratio D 2/ENP, with ENP 522 define defined as a national average over constituency level values based on vote 523 shares of candidates. This will be followed by regressions that confirm what a visual 524 inspection of the data appears to indicate.
525
Using ENP in the form of a ratio is convenient transformation because in the 526 Duverger-Demsetz view, the ENP Ratio will equal 1 in the long run of an electoral 527 system that is highly contestable and will decline as the number of parties increases 528 above 2. Recall that it is also the case that the AMS and PS indexes take a value 529 of 1 when reflecting the highest degree of competitiveness and decline in value 530 as competitiveness decreases. It follows that if increases in each of these indexes 531 measure greater competiveness, all three measures should be positively related.
532
As the regression lines on the scatter diagram of Fig. 4 suggest, the ENP Ratio 533 is positively related to both competitive measures, implying that fragmentation has 534 a negative association with competitiveness. In the upper portion of the figure it 535 can be see that as ENP Ratio rises towards 1, so does contestability as indicated 536 by a rise in the values of the asymmetry adjusted marginal seat index AMS. Here, 537 then, is qualified support for the Duverger-Demsetz view. We say 'qualified support' 538 because of the potential sensitivity of our conclusion to alternative assumptions that 539 could be made in the construction of our index that have yet to be explored.
540
We can also see in the figure that the PS index of volatility adjusted vote margins 541 is also positively related to the ENP Ratio, indicating that fragmentation and our 542 preferred measure of competitiveness as closeness are negatively related. This is 543 further evidence that in the Canadian case at least, fragmentation is not positively 544 correlated with competitiveness.
545
Closer inspection of Fig. 4 indicates that there are some episodes in which 546 observations tend to cluster off of the regression lines. These clusters suggest 547 controlling factors that can be used in regressions to remove anomalies that distract 548 from the underlying relationships. Two groupings of elections are of interest in this 549 respect: first, elections during the world wars, which likely saw the introduction 550 of elements that would not be present under normal circumstances; and, second, 551 elections in the period before 1900 when the party system in Canada was maturing. 552 The relationship between fragmentation, represented by the ENP Ratio, and the 553 competitiveness indexes AMS and PS, as well as the role of the dummy variables for 554 war and the early years of the party system, are explored in the regressions presented 555 in Table 2 on the following page.
556
The general appearance of positive, significant coefficients on the AMS and 557 PS indexes across the first three columns representing different versions of the 558 equation for 2/ENP confirm what visual inspection of the scatter diagram in Fig. 4 559 suggests, namely that more fragmentation is associated with less contestability (see 560 the coefficient on AMS), and less competition defined as closeness (and uncertainty) 561 of electoral contests.
562
By using the ENP Ratio as the dependent variable in Table 2 , we do not mean 563 to imply that the equations in the table represent a causal relationship running from 564 the AMS or PS indexes to ENP. Rather the regression equations represent a long run 565 equilibrium relationship in which the number of parties, their vote shares and degree 566 of competitiveness are all simultaneously determined. Accordingly, the dynamic 567 least squares (DOLS) estimation in columns four and five of the table treat the model 568 tabulated as a cointegrating relation, and allow for the possibility that standard errors 569 of the OLS regressions may be biased by correlations across time arising among the 570 three variables ENP, AMS and PS. Consider the DOLS results in the fourth or second to last column in Table 2 . 572 The stationarity of the residuals of this model and the fact that the coefficient 573 estimates on AMS and PS retain their sign and significance compared to the OLS 574 results further supports the view that contestability as well as electoral uncertainty 575 are on average both negatively related to party fragmentation over the history of 576 parliamentary elections in Canada. Before turning to consider the extension of our ideas to proportional repre-578 sentation systems, it is useful to consider how the statistical relationship between 579 fragmentation and contestability carries over to a situation in which fragmentation 580 is measured at the national party level, as indicated by ENP measured using vote 581 shares of (12) parties at the national level, labeled ENP12party in Tables 1 and 2 . As 582 Table 1 shows, in Canada this measure of the effective number of parties is highly 583 correlated with ENP defined over candidates at the constituency level, at 0.88, and 584 is generally larger that the constituency based ENP.
16
585
We expect that a high degree of contestability at the national level will put 586 pressure on third and fourth place parties in the constituencies. In extreme cases, 587 it is conceivable that one party will dominate in a particular region, and another 588 party in another, with contestability remaining high at the center where there 589 are then two (or even more) major opposing parties, each of which has many 590 candidates that are 'safe' in their own region of dominance. While our measure 591 of contestability-the AMS index-can handle such situations, ENP defined as an 592 average over constituencies may not. In the example outlined, average fragmentation 593 at the constituency level will be low, while at the national level it remains more 594 robust.
595
To allow for such situations, we also include the fifth column in Table 2 , where 596 the left side variable is now ENP12party Ratio, which is 2 divided by ENP defined 597 at the national level using vote shares of 12 parties that have existed over Canadian 598 parliamentary history.
17 Despite the complications of going from the constituency 599 to the national level, we see that the statistically significant inverse relationship 600 between fragmentation and the contestability index AMS still remains in the DOLS 601 estimates, though not with quite the same statistical strength. The PS index of 602 closeness or electoral uncertainty at the constituency level is now insignificant, 603 perhaps reflecting situations in which contestability remains at the national level 604 even though there are parties that have carved out for themselves safe seats that are 605 regionally concentrated.
606
16 In Canada from 1867 to about the start of the first world war, the number of parties as reflected by ENP12party declined steadily to about 2 at the outbreak of the war. Thereafter, both ENP12party and ENP defined as an average over the constituencies began to rise, with ENP12party being uniformly higher than ENP. Since Duverger's Law is a long run result, it is not clear whether or not either enp index is systematically greater than 2 in the long run. Investigation of that issue requires a dynamic empirical model of enp, which to our knowledge has not yet been constructed for Canada or elsewhere. 17 Again, see the Appendix for the definition of party used here. 
Does the Duverger-Demsetz Perspective Extend
607
to Proportional Systems? 608 To complete our analysis of electoral competition from the Duverger-Demsetz 609 perspective, we consider whether our ideas about the importance and role of con-610 testability in SMP electoral systems can be extended to proportional representation 611 in multi seat elections (PR)? Here we are of two minds.
612
On the one hand, if there is a single party in government, the exact argument 613 given earlier for why two parties produce a highly contestable electoral system in 614 the plurality setting will also apply to the PR setting. As we have argued earlier, 615 the greater is the degree of party fragmentation, the less effective will be the 616 second or third placed parties as a constraint on the performance of the governing 617 party. Moreover, the work that has been done on extensions of Duverger's Law 618 for proportional representation systems is based on the argument that the carrying 619 capacity of a PR system (defined in terms of ENP at the district level) will be a 620 function of the district magnitude, M, in that system, i.e., the number of seats being 621 contested in a given district (or the size of median district overall). The carrying 622 capacity of the system is either expected to have an upper bound of M C 1 (Cox 623 1997) and will thus be above 2 for M > 1, or expected to be, on average, the square 624 root of M C 1 (Taagepera and Shugart 1989), which is above 2 for M > 4. Because 625 values of M > 1 mean that, for PR systems, we expect to see more than 2 winning 626 parties, this means that the likelihood of there being a single party majority tends to 627 diminish with M (Rae 1967).
628
Since coalitions are likely to emerge in PR systems and because coalitions are 629 difficult to arrange and maintain, there will sometimes be minority governments. It 630 may therefore appear to be the case that a PR system is more contestable since it 631 is easier to displace a minority government. However, the opposition is also likely 632 to be fragmented under PR for the same reasons, regardless of whether there is a 633 minority or a majority in government, and the opposition coalition, if there is one, 634 will also tend to be difficult to maintain over time. Hence, a rise in ENP above 2 can 635 also signal a decline in effective electoral competitiveness in a PR system.
636
From the Duverger-Demsetz perspective, the 'best' situation would be one where 637 there is a strong coalition in government to provide public services, and a strong 638 coalition in opposition threatening to replace it, the same situation that leads to 639 a high degree of contestability (and efficiency) in an SMP system. In general, 640 then, fragmentation of the party system under PR is not conducive to contestability 641 because of the costs of forming and maintaining party coalitions, and the best 642 outcome under PR mimics that for the SMP system. Hence we arrive at essentially 643 the same assessment as for SMP, though by a different route.
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18 There is an additional, conceptually distinct source of inefficiency that may worsen with fragmentation under PR. This stems from the possibility that each party in a PR system focuses its electoral promises on a narrower segment of the electorate than does a party under SMP. If so, the public sector under PR will be driven more by the demands of special interests and pay less On the other hand, if we approach competition in terms of the measures used by 645 Blais and Lago (2009) or Grofman and Selb (2009), we can think of competition 646 increasing with M, because the threshold of exclusion-the largest vote share that 647 a party can achieve and still be denied even a single seat-declines with M for 648 all PR electoral rules. Thus entry of new parties is generally easier under PR than 649 in an SMP system, and entry is another important dimension of competitiveness. 650 Moreover, while the check on the behavior of the governing party generated by a 651 truly viable single competitor, emphasized as the root of electoral contestability in 652 a plurality system, does not apply in the PR context, what may apply is a growing 653 multiplicity of viable alternatives to the present governing coalition that include 654 some but not all elements of that coalition joined to other parties not in the present 655 coalition.
656
By throwing up what is likely to be a wider range of alternatives, a fact that is 657 sometimes taken to be a major failing of PR systems, namely the relative fragility 658 of multiparty coalitions in terms of durability, may be given a positive interpretation 659 from the economic perspective we have offered in this paper. To put this another 660 way, we may say that the analysis of PR and, by implication, of SMP is not complete 661 without considering the entry dimension of electoral competition, a dimension that 662 is not identical to contestability. 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Work
664
We have considered a number of distinctive ways to think about electoral com-665 petition in SMP systems, focusing on the issue of whether fragmentation or 666 concentration of the electoral landscape in terms of vote shares, electoral uncertainty 667 as measured by the closeness of contests, and the overall contestability of elections 668 as indexed by asymmetry between major parties in the number of marginal seats 669 stand as equivalent or even complementary indicators of greater electoral compe-670 tition. The Duverger-Demsetz perspective, which emphasizes the contestability of 671 elections, suggests these are not equivalents.
672
For SMP systems in particular, logic suggests that contestability will diminish 673 with party fragmentation-in other words, that an increase in the effective number 674 of parties (or in other related measures of fragmentation) is associated with reduced 675 attention to the provision of public services, compared to an SMP system which effectively blocks some interests that are not regionally concentrated. (For example, the Greens in Canada may have 5 % of the vote in every constituency, but they elect only one member of parliament from a place known for voters who have a strong taste for the environment). On the other hand, some argue that candidates who must appeal to voters within a small geographic area and who can differentiate themselves from their competitors by making promises for narrowly targeted pork barrel items are more likely to arise in a SMP system than in a PR system (Carey and Shugart 1995; Tabellini 2000, 2005) . We cannot resolve this debate over the role of electoral systems in the link between fragmentation, special interests and inefficiency here. 
711
The 12 party classification employed throughout the paper is based on three 712 criteria: A party exists as such if it gained at least 4 % of the popular vote in at 713 least one election and contested at least 1 % of the seats in at least one election-714 there are 23 parties satisfying these two criteria-plus it must have won at least 1 715 seat in at least two elections. There are 11 parties satisfying all these criteria over 716 
736
AMS_1std D an asymmetry adjusted measure of marginal seats, using an histor-737 ical volatility and a 1 standard deviation test to define when an incumbent's seat is 738 safe. Aggregate volatility is then computed as follows: Average vote shares by party 759 over constituencies within a superconstituency for each election are computed. 760 For each superconstituency in each election, the absolute value of the changes in 761 these (party-specific) average vote shares across adjacent elections is computed, 762 summed and divided by 2. Each of these superconstituency specific differences in 763 vote shares is then weighted by the relative number of constituencies inside each 764 superconstituency, and summed to derive an aggregate volatility number for each 765 election.
766
Volatility so computed is shown in Fig. 5 for the 2nd to 41st election (1869-767 2011) in Canada. The peaks in the 14th and 35th elections are noticeable. Whether 768 there is a trend in volatility or not is difficult to determine.
769
19 Note that the use of one past period to construct our volatility measure means that the index can begin only in the second election. This also implies the unavoidable loss of some information when new provinces are added to the country, such as Newfoundland's entry into Canada in 1949. 
